Abstract-We investigate a routing game that allows for the creation of coalitions, within the framework of cooperative game theory. Specifically, we describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value. This represents the performance that the coalition can guarantee itself, under any (including worst) conditions. We then investigate fundamental solution concepts of the considered cooperative game, namely the core and a variant of the min-max fair nucleolus. We consider two types of routing games based on the agents' Performance Objectives, namely bottleneck routing games and additive routing games. For bottleneck games, we establish that the core includes all system-optimal flow profiles and that the nucleolus is system-optimal or disadvantageous for the smallest agent in the system. Moreover, we describe an interesting set of scenarios for which the nucleolus is always system-optimal. For additive games, we focus on the fundamental load balancing game of routing over parallel links. We establish that, contrary to bottleneck games, not all system-optimal flow profiles lie in the core. However, we describe a specific system-optimal flow profile that does lie in the core and, under assumptions of symmetry, is equal to the nucleolus.
INTRODUCTION
T O date, game theoretic models have been employed in virtually all networking contexts. These include control tasks at the network layer, such as flow control and routing (e.g., [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] ). In particular, research until now in routing games has mainly focused on non-cooperative networking games, where the selfish decision makers (i.e., the users or agents) cannot communicate and reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the network infrastructure. Moreover, the main dynamics that were considered were Best-Response, i.e., each agent would observe the present state of the network and react to it in a self-optimizing manner. Accordingly, the operating points of such systems were taken to be some equilibria of the underlying non-cooperative game, most notably Nash equilibria. Such equilibria are inherently inefficient and, in general, exhibit suboptimal network performance. As a result, the question of how bad the quality of a non-cooperative equilibrium is with respect to a centrally enforced optimum has received considerable attention e.g., [4] , [5] .
However, there is a growing number of networking scenarios where, while there is competition among self-optimizing agents, there is also a possibility for these agents to communicate, negotiate and reach a binding agreement (see, e.g., [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] ). Indeed, in many scenarios, the competition is among business organizations, which can, and often do, reach agreements (e.g., SLAs) on the way that they provide, consume or share the network resources. The proper framework for analyzing such settings is that of Cooperative Game Theory [14] , [15] . Such a paradigm transfer, from non-cooperative to cooperative games, calls to revisit fundamental concepts. Indeed, the operating point of the network is not an equilibrium of a non-cooperative game anymore, but rather a solution of a cooperative game. Accordingly, the performance degradation of such systems should be considered at new operating points. In the realm of routing games, such an operating point has been proposed in [16] , which considered the adoption of the Nash Bargaining Scheme (NBS) [17] as a way of reducing the potentially high inefficiency of the Nash Equilibrium. 1 Nevertheless, the NBS only contemplates two scenarios, namely the "grand coalition" (i.e., an agreement reached by all agents) and the disagreement point, i.e., the outcome of the fully non-cooperative scenario. Thus, while bargaining between entities is encouraged at the NBS, it might be advantageous for groups to deviate from the agreed strategy and form subcoalitions. Such deviations are to be avoided, since it returns the network to its inefficient non-cooperative scenario. Accordingly, in the current study we diverge from [16] by allowing users to form subcoalitions and we focus on routing strategies for which deviations of subcoalitions do not occur when agents behave in a rational manner. A design guideline would be to have a mediator, e.g., a network administrator, propose to all agents in the network only to route their flow according to such stable operating points. More importantly, this gives a credible guarantee to all agents that the agreed upon solution will be implemented. To represent the set of stable 1 . The NBS has been considered in other networking scenarios, e.g., [6] . However, to the best of our knowledge, [16] is the first to consider the NBS in the context of routing games.
operating points, we focus on the core [15] of our game. Since the core might include several solutions, we further consider a specific solution in the core with min-max fairness properties, which is a variant of the nucleolus [18] .
When considering a coalitional game with N agents, a major question is what cost should be attributed to each of the 2 N possible coalitions. In other words, which scenario can each coalition expect in the network when deviating from the agreed upon solution? In the traditional game theoretic setting all agents try to minimize their cost function, however in the context of networking, it is often plausible to contemplate scenarios in which some agents do not care about optimizing their own cost, but seem to act maliciously towards others [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] . Such behavior is due to a range of reasons, e.g., hackers or rivaling companies that aim to degrade network quality. Moreover and perhaps more notably, it may happen that some agents are not aware of how to optimize their cost, hence they might exhibit seemingly "irrational", thus unexpected, behavior. Due to the lack of predictability, a coalition does not know what to expect, hence it is inclined to take a worst-case approach in order to know what it can guarantee itself under any given conditions. In light of such settings, we model the cost of a coalition to equal its worst-case scenario. Specifically, we describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value [25] , i.e., as the corresponding best-response to the maximin strategy of the agents outside the coalition. 2, 3 This represents the cost that a coalition can guarantee itself, even under the pessimistic expectation that the agents outside the coalition have unpredictable or even malicious objectives. More importantly, this way of modeling gives an a priori insight into any agreement proposed by a mediator. Clearly, no agreement can be reached between all agents if a subset of agents can guarantee itself a better outcome at its worst-case scenario.
Note that for certain stable solutions such as the core, describing the cost of a coalition as its maximin value implies that after a coalition S deviates from the agreed upon strategy, the users outside the coalition are willing to act maliciously, even if it is not in their best interest. Although it is sufficient for a coalition S to believe that the users outside the coalition are willing to realize their threat, a more practical solution can be proposed to the users, namely: before a solution is implemented, all users sign on an agreement through which they are forced to carry out their threat or else face heavy penalties.
We concretize our study of coalitions in routing games by considering two types of games based on the structure of the agents' performance objectives. The first game considers agents with bottleneck objectives, i.e., their performance is determined by the worst component (link) in the network [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] . Bottleneck routing games have been shown to emerge in many practical scenarios. For example, in wireless networks, the weakest link in a transmission is determined by the node with the least remaining battery power. Hence, each agent would route traffic so as to maximize the smallest battery lifetime along its routing topology. Additionally, bottleneck routing games arise in congested networks where it is desirable to move traffic away from congested hot spots. Another major framework where bottleneck games are encountered is traffic engineering, where in view of the limited size of transmission buffers, each of the users is interested in minimizing the utilization of its most utilized buffer in order to avoid deadlocks and reduce packet loss. For further discussion and additional examples see [26] . The second type of game considers agents with additive performance measures, where the performance is determined by the sum of its link performances, e.g., delay or packet loss [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] , [39] .
Much of the current literature on routing games has focused on users with either bottleneck or additive performance measures, albeit in the traditional setting of non-cooperative agents. The main difference between most of the previous works and our current study is that we allow users to reach binding agreements between each other and form subcoalitions in order to improve their performance. Moreover, we describe the cost of a coalition as its maximin value. 4 In order to accurately highlight the difference between the outcome of the noncooperative and cooperative scenarios, we modeled our game to exactly follow the widely accepted models taken from previous work on noncooperative routing games, where the user and system performance is solely determined by its performance in the network (see [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] , [39] and the citations therein). 5 
Our Contribution
We focus our study on the atomic splittable routing model [1] , [26] , in which each agent sends its non-negligible demand to the destination by splitting it over a set of paths in the network. Moreover, agents are able to cooperate and form coalitions. In particular, we formulate a Non-Transferable Utility Coalitional Game [15] and describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value. For bottleneck routing games we establish that coalitions with larger aggregated demand receive a smaller cost at their maximin flow profile. Through this result, we describe a set of flow profiles that are stable, 6 i.e., from which it is not worthwhile for any coalition to deviate. In particular, to represent the set of stable solutions, we focus on the core and a variant of the min-max fair nucleolus. For bottleneck games we establish that any system-optimal flow profile lies in the core. Moreover, at the nucleolus we establish that (1) all agents route their flow according to the system optimum or (2) only the smallest agent experiences performance that is worse than at the 2. When dealing with payoffs instead of costs, this corresponds to the minimax value of a coalition [25] . Alternatively, this scenario can be viewed as a Stackelberg game [15] , where an adversary, which acts as "leader", tries to maximize the cost of the coalition, which acts as "follower". Recently, in [24] , the maximin value of two-player games has been studied in the restricted setting of users with M=M=1 cost functions.
3. In our considered game, the maximin strategy of the agents outside the coalition does not necessarily equal the minimax strategy of the coalition.
4. Furthermore, we note that previous studies in routing games have considered coalitions among nonatomic users [39] , [40] ; however, in our study, we consider coalitions in the considerably more complex context of atomic users.
5. There might exists scenarios for which the performance of the users and system is determined by an "additive-bottleneck" variant, such as, where the cost is equal to K times the bottleneck cost [41] , where K denotes the number of hops to the destination. This scenario is an interesting possible extension of the "pure bottleneck" model considered in this study.
6. Formally, the core [15] considers a set of stable cost allocations, each of which, in our routing game, refers to a set of flow profiles. While abiding by the mathematical definition of the core, in the context of this paper, we will also refer to the corresponding routing strategy flow profiles as being stable.
system optimum. Next, we describe an interesting set of scenarios in which the nucleolus is always system-optimal. Specifically, and surprisingly, we establish that in a network where the two smallest agents are of equal size, the nucleolus is always system-optimal. A special case of this scenario is when all agents have equal demands.
For additive routing games we focus on the framework of routing in a "parallel links" network. Beyond being a basic framework of routing, this is the generic framework of load balancing among servers in a network. It has been the subject of numerous studies in the context of non-cooperative networking games, e.g., [1] , [3] , [5] , [35] , [37] , [39] , to name a few. Quite surprisingly, we establish that at the maximin strategy, the "malicious" agents outside the coalition act as if they were a continuum of infinitesimal (i.e., nonatomic) self-optimizing agents. With the above structural result at hand, we establish that, in contrast to bottleneck games, not all system-optimal flow profiles are necessarily stable. Nevertheless, we prove that a particular system-optimal flow profile does lie in the core, namely where all agents send their demand proportionally with respect to the system optimum. Finally, we show that when agents have equal demands, this proportional system-optimal flow profile is also equal to the nucleolus.
MODEL AND GAME THEORETIC FORMULATIONS

Model
We consider a set N ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; Ng of selfish "users" (or, "players", "agents"), which share a communication network modeled by a directed graph GðV; EÞ, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . We denote by P the set of all paths in the network. Each user i 2 N has a traffic demand r i and all users share a common source S and common destination D. Denote the aggregated demand of users in the coalition S N as r S , and the demand of all the users as R, i.e., R ¼ P i2N r i . A user ships its demand from S to D by splitting it along the paths in P, i.e., user i decides what fraction of r i should be sent on each path. We denote by f i p , the flow that user i 2 N sends on path p 2 P. User i can fix any value for f i p , as long as f i p ! 0 (non-negativity constraint) and P p2P f i p ¼ r i (demand constraint); this assignment of traffic to paths, f i ¼ ff i p g p2P shall also be referred to as the routing strategy of user i. The (routing strategy) flow profile f is the vector of all user routing strategies, f ¼ ðf 1 ; f 2 ; . . . ; f N Þ. We say that a user's routing strategy is feasible if its components obey the nonnegativity and demand constraints. We say that a flow profile f is feasible if it is composed of feasible routing strategies and we denote by F i the convex and compact set of all feasible f i 's. Also denote the set F as the set of all feasible flow profiles. Turning our attention to a path p 2 P, let f p be the total flow on that path i. e . Occasionally, we focus on the framework of routing in a "parallel links" network. In such cases GðV; EÞ corresponds to a graph with parallel "links" (e.g., communication links, servers, etc.) L ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; Lg, L > 1, and a user ships its demand by splitting it over the links L, see Fig. 2 . As observed in [42] , it constitutes an appropriate model for seemingly unrelated networking problems. For example, in a QoS-supporting network architecture, bandwidth may be separated among different virtual paths, resulting effectively in a system of parallel and noninterfering "links" between the source and destination. Additionally, one can consider a corporation or organization that receives service from a number of different network providers. The corporation can split its total flow over the various network facilities (according to performance and cost considerations), each of which can be represented as a link in the parallel link model.
In GðV; EÞ, we associate with each link a performance function T e ðÁÞ, which corresponds to the cost per unit of flow through link e and only depends on the total flow f e . Furthermore, we impose the following assumptions on T e ðf e Þ: S1 T e ðf e Þ is continuous and strictly increasing in f e . S2 T e : ½0; 1Þ ! ½0; 1. S3 For every flow profile f, if not all costs are finite then at least one user with infinite cost can change its own strategy to make its cost finite. Cost functions that comply with the above assumptions shall be referred to as standard. The performance measure of a user i 2 N is given by a cost function J i ðfÞ. In bottleneck routing games, J i ðfÞ corresponds to the performance of the worst-case link, and in additive routing games it corresponds to the sum of all link performances in the system. An N-tuple of positive values J ¼ ðJ 1 ; J 2 ; . . . ; J N Þ is said to be a feasible cost vector if there is a feasible routing strategy flow profile f 2 F such that, for all 1 i N, J i ¼ J i ðfÞ. Denote the set of feasible cost vectors by J .
Bottleneck Routing Cost Function
Following [26] , we represent the cost of a user i 2 N as the worst performance of any link in the network that i sends a positive amount of flow on. Thus, the cost of user i equals
In addition to the bottleneck link, a user's performance can be determined by other metrics, such as (multi-hop) delays. Nevertheless, previous works on bottleneck routing games, e.g., [26] , [27] , [29] , [31] , [32] , [33] focus on the fundamental case where the user's performance is entirely determined by its bottleneck link, as described by (1).
We measure the welfare of the system through the cost of the worst performing link in the network, i.e., through a ("social") cost function J sys defined as J sys , max e2Ejf e > 0 T e ðf e Þ. For bottleneck routing games we consider users with standard cost functions.
Additive Routing Cost Function
Another important class of problems is when users are interested in additive performance measures, e.g., delay or packet loss. In this case, T e may correspond to the total delay of link e. Following [1] , [42] , [43] and many others, we consider users whose cost functions are of the following form:
Moreover, we consider T e ðf e Þ to be convex and continuously differentiable. An interesting class of link delays is the one that follows the M=M=1 queuing model, where
Such delay functions are broadly used in modeling the behavior of links in computer communication networks [44] , [45] .
As commonly assumed in the literature (e.g., [3] , [4] , [35] , [37] , [38] , [42] , [43] ), for additive routing games the system's cost is equal to the sum of the individual costs of the players, i.e., J sys ¼ P i2N J i . The system's cost thus equals:
System Optimization
We denote the optimal value of the system's cost as J Ã sys , i.e., the minimal value of J sys over all feasible routing strategy flow profiles. Any flow profile that corresponds to the system optimum, we denote by f Ã ¼ ðf 
Nonatomic Users
In this study we focus on a finite set of (nonzero-size) users that can split their flow among the links. Nevertheless, some of the following results state that at times a user may behave as if it were a continuum of infinitesimal self-optimizing users, referred to as a set of nonatomic users. A nonatomic user places its demand on a single pathp, for which P e2p T e ðf e Þ ¼ min p2P P e2p T e ðf e Þ [46] . If a finite user i behaves as if it were a set of self-optimizing nonatomic users, it follows that, 8p; p 2 P:
We will refer to (5) as the best-response behavior of a set of nonatomic users.
Coalitional Game
We proceed to formalize our coalitional game, by attributing a set of costs to every coalition S N. Note that our cost functions represent a variety of costs, e.g., delay, which are not considered to be a commodity that users can freely transfer between themselves, hence we define a Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) Game [15] , as follows.
Definition 2.1. A NTU coalitional game consists of a mapping
V ðÁÞ that assigns to each coalition S N a set of outcomes V ðSÞ R jSj , which is non-empty, closed and convex.
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A coalition behaves as a single user controlling the flow of its participants and V ðSÞ represents the set of feasible cost allocations that S can achieve for itself. Note that V ðSÞ is only dependent on the coalition S, i.e., we investigate a game in NTU coalitional form [14] [15] . In general, in routing games the cost of a coalition S is dependent on how the players in N nS are partitioned among coalitions. Thus, one can alternatively model a coalitional routing game in the more general partition form, where given a coalition structure B, i.e., a partition of N , V ðS; BÞ represents the set of feasible cost allocations that S can achieve [14] . However, in this study we focus on the worstcase scenario of S, hence the users in N nS behave as a single coalition aiming to maximize the cost of S and except for Theorem 3.2, B stays the same throughout the paper.
Furthermore, we note that the graph GðV; EÞ does not represent the underlying communication between users. Instead, the shape of GðV; EÞ together with the users' demands creates the strategy space of the users. Only the link performances define a user's and subsequently a coalition's cost. Therefore, V ðSÞ is not dependent on how the members in S are connected and we do not consider coalitional games in graph form.
BOTTLENECK ROUTING GAMES
Maximin Flow Profile
As explained in the introduction, our goal is to propose stable and fair routing strategies to all N users. However, once a coalition of users S decides to deviate from our proposed solution, we model it to incur a worst-case cost. Specifically, we represent the cost of every coalition that deviates (and there are 2 jN j À 1 such possible coalitions), as its maximin value in the game between S and the users in N nS. The maximin value of S corresponds to the lowest cost S can guarantee against the worst (for S) strategy of the users outside the coalition. In other words, all users in N nS aim to maximize J S by sending their flow according to f N N nS . Given f N N nS , S behaves as a single user controlling the flow of its participants and aims to minimize their combined cost J S . Clearly, by cooperating, the users in N nS can only increase their damage to S. Therefore, when considering the 7. In [15] , the following additional condition is cited fxjx 2 V ðSÞ and x i ! v i ; 8i 2 Sg is a bounded subset of R S ; (6) where v i ¼ maxfy i jy i 2 V ðfigÞg < 1. In other words, v i is the maximum payoff that any player can guarantee itself and it is finite. Condition (6) says that a coalition cannot offer unbounded payoffs to any player, unless it gives less to some other player in the coalition than he could get alone. It is trivial that this holds for our game, since a coalition cannot lower a player's cost below 0 without hurting some other player.
In fact, in our game a coalition can never lower a player's cost to 0.
maximin value of S, we represent all users in N nS as a single malicious user that aims to maximize the cost of S. For each coalition we can now view this as a game between two players, S and N nS. Given any routing strategy f N N nS denote the best-response strategy of coalition S aŝ
The maximin strategy of the users in N nS is equal tô
and givenf N N nS , the coalition S send its demand according to its best-response strategy, i.e.,
We refer to ðf N N nS ;f S ðf N N nS ÞÞ as the maximin (routing strategy) flow profile. 8 To simplify the notation, we will frequently refer tof S ðf N N nS Þ asf S . From the point of view of the coalition, at the maximin flow profile, the users outside of the coalition act in a malicious manner. Since a coalition S behaves as a single user controlling the flow of its participants, it follows from (1) that in a bottleneck routing game,
where f S e represents the combined flow of all users i 2 S on link e, i.e., f S e ¼ P i2S f i e . In order to describe the behavior of a coalition at the maximin flow profile, we first establish the following lemma. 
Proof. We establish the lemma by constructing a routing strategy f N N nS , such that
Then, as a result of (11) and (8), the lemma follows. For every path p, consider f
by sending the remaining demand (i.e., r N nS À r N nT ) on the paths wheref 
Denote the best-response strategyf S ð f N N nS Þ as f S and assume by contradiction that
From (12) it follows that
We now define a new routing strategy f T where for any
Sincef T is the bestresponse strategy tof N N nT , we get that 
As a result of (13) and (14) it follows that
Therefore,
By definition, for any link e where h N nS e > 0 it holds that f T e > 0. Thus, from (15) and (16) 
Finally, from (17) and (14) we get that According
words, the threat of the users outside the coalition decreases when the coalition's demand increases.
Worst-Case Coalitions
We now proceed to describe our coalitional game as defined in Definition 2.1. In particular, for each coalition S, denote by ðf N N nS ;f S Þ a maximin routing strategy flow profile of the game between S and N nS, i.e., the flow profile in which N nS acts according to (8) and S acts according to (9) . Also denote Jðf N N nS ;f S Þ 2 J as the cost vector of all users, when sending their demand according to ðf N N nS ;f S Þ. Furthermore, denote by J S ðf N N nS ;f S Þ the projection of Jðf N N nS ;f S Þ onto R S , i.e., the cost vector of the users in the coalition S. Note that J S ðf N N nS ;f S Þ is not equal to J S ðf N N nS ;f S Þ, as the former is a cost function and the latter a vector of user costs. We now define our mapping of V ðSÞ.
Definition 3.1. For every coalition S N :
Thus, given a coalition of users S, V ðSÞ is a set of all possible cost vectors in which N nS sends its flow according to (8) and S sends its flow according to (9) . It is clear that V ðSÞ satisfies the conditions of an NTU coalitional game. Closedness follows directly from Assumption S2 and following [15] , [16] , it can be shown that V ðSÞ is convex. Having defined the worst-case coalitional game, we proceed to investigate it through the study of several (fair and stable) solution concepts of cooperative game theory.
The Core
We consider the game as defined in Definition 3.1 and continue to describe its core, i.e., a set of solutions that are stable against coalitional deviations [15] . Definition 3.2. Given an NTU coalitional game V ðÁÞ, the core of the game is a set of cost vectors J c J such that 8J 2 J c , 8S N and for any J 2 J :
Translated to our scenario, a feasible cost vector lies in the core if there does not exist any coalition S, such that all users in S strictly decrease their cost when sending their demand according to any maximin flow profile ðf N N nS ;f S Þ. We continue with the following theorem. 
Consider a system-optimal flow profile f Ã and denote the
Hence, there exists some coalition S and user j 2 S for which In other words, for any coalition S N , any maximin flow profile ðf N N nS ;f S Þ and any system-optimal flow profile f Ã , there always exists some user j 2 S which receives a higher (or equal) cost at ðf N N nS ;f S Þ compared to f Ã .
Thus, any system-optimal flow profile f Ã corresponds to a cost vector that lies in the core. t u
In the proof of Theorem 3.1 we established that for any coalition S N , there exists a user that prefers the system-optimal flow profile over any maximin flow profile. We will show that the same result holds with respect to the system-optimal flow profile and any Nash equilibrium.
Suppose we consider a different coalitional game than the one described in Definition 3.1, in which a deviating coalition S does not incur a maximin cost. Specifically, in this new game the users in the coalition S work together as a single large user, while the users outside the coalition do not aim to maximize the cost of S. Instead, they do not cooperate and their goal is to minimize their own costs. Denote the set of users outside the coalition as f1; 2; . . . ; N S g, where N S ¼ jN nSj. Thus, for each deviating coalition S N , we consider a non-cooperative game between the users fS; 1; . . . ; N S g, where each user i aims to minimize its own cost. The next theorem is proven in Appendix A, which is available in the IEEE Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ TNSE.2018.2876445. Theorem 3.2. Consider users with bottleneck objectives and consider an NTU coalitional game, where for any S N , V ðSÞ is equal to the set of Nash equilibria between S and all individual users in N nS. Any system-optimal flow profile corresponds to a cost vector that lies in the core.
For the remainder of the paper we only consider the worstcase NTU coalitional game as defined in Definition 3.1.
The Routing Game Nucleolus
Theorem 3.1 establishes that in a bottleneck routing game, no coalition of users wishes to deviate from any flow profile which is optimal from a system's perspective. Yet, out of all the stable flow profiles in the core, which one should be proposed to the users in the network? We proceed to consider a further refinement of the core with additional fairness guarantees. In particular, we focus on a routing strategy flow profile which preserves stability while adding min-max fairness properties to the users. For that, we consider a variant of the well studied Nucleolus [18] . Although the nucleolus is originally defined for Transferable-Utility games [14] , we shall adapt its definition to fit our model. Extensions of the nucleolus to Non-Transferable Utility Coalitional games are not yet universally agreed upon in game theory, and in our paper we make an initial attempt to formalize a variant of the nucleolus for NTU routing games. Due to this adjustment, certain attributes such as its uniqueness are not guaranteed, unless proven. Moreover, we will need to prove that the nucleolus lies in the core of the game. Consider a feasible cost vector JðfÞ 2 J . We define the excess of each coalition S & N at JðfÞ as
where J S ðfÞ corresponds to the coalition's cost at flow profile f. For bottleneck routing games, J S ðfÞ corresponds to (10), thus the excess of a coalition S is equal to e S ðJðfÞÞ , max 
For ease of notation we shall refer to e S ðJðfÞÞ as e S ðJÞ. The excess can be interpreted as the "dissatisfaction" of a coalition S at a cost vector JðfÞ. The smaller the excess, the more a coalition S is satisfied. Note that even though the maximin flow profile is not necessarily unique, due to (8), J S ðf N N nS ;f S Þ is equal for all maximin flow profiles.
Denote the excess vector eðJÞ ¼ ½e S ðJÞ S&N , and denote e Ã ðJÞ as a permutation of the entries of eðJÞ arranged in non-increasing order. Hence, the RGN is the cost vector that minimizes the excess of the coalitions in the lexicographic ordering, i.e., it treats the welfare of coalitions in a min-max fair manner. We denote the vector of user costs at the Routing Game Nucleolus as J RGN . Throughout the rest of the paper we will regularly refer to the RGN as the nucleolus. 
As a result of (23), for any coalition S there exists some user k 2 S for which In other words, for any coalition S there exists some user k 2 S that receives a lower cost at the nucleolus compared to any maximin flow profile. Thus, the nucleolus lies in the core. t u
We now continue to describe the RGN. Before doing so, we bring the following definition from [48] .
Definition 3.4.
A flow profile f is referred to as balanced if for any two paths p 1 ; p 2 2 P with f p 1 > 0, it holds that max e2p 1 T e ðf e Þ max e2p 2 T e ðf e Þ.
In other words, at a balanced flow profile, every possible path with positive flow has the same cost for its worst-case link. In [48] , the next lemma is proven. [48] ]. Consider a bottleneck routing game. Any system-optimal flow profile is balanced. 9 For the following theorem denote the user with the smallest demand as j, i.e., r j ¼ min k2N r k .
Lemma 3.2 [Lemma 1 in
Theorem 3.3. Consider a bottleneck routing game.
(1): 
Assume by contradiction that there exists some user k 2 K for which J k RGN > J Ã sys . Thus, 9 . In [48] , a bottleneck routing game was investigated, with noncooperative users. Lemma 1 in [48] considers the system-optimal flow, which does not distinguish between individual users and their strategies. Therefore, we are able to apply this result in our current paper which deals with a cooperative game instead of a non-cooperative game. Only the user with the smallest demand sends its flow on the worst-case link in the system, while the other users receive a similar or better performance than at the system optimum. This result is quite surprising, and combined with Lemma 3.2, Theorem 3.3 illustrates that the smallest user in the system is never better off at the nucleolus than at any system-optimal flow profile. In the following example, we illustrate two different networks, where each corresponds to one of the scenarios of Theorem 3.3.
Example 3.1. Consider the network in Fig. 3 , where for each link e 2 Enfng, T e ðf e Þ ¼ f e . Moreover, consider two users, r 1 ¼ 2 and r 2 ¼ 20. At the system-optimal flow profile, both users split their flow equally among the paths fS; A; Dg and fS; B; Dg. We first describe the maximin flow profile of user 2. User 1 maximizes the cost of user 2 by placing all of its flow on the path fS; A; B; Dg. As a best-response, user 2 places 2=3 on link n and splits the rest of its flow equally among the paths fS; A; Dg and fS; B; Dg. Thus,
. We now consider the excess of user 1. If user 2 places an amount of 5 on link n and sends the rest on path fS; A; B; Dg, then the best-response strategy of users 1 is to split its entire demand on the paths fS; A; Dg and fS; B; Dg. Now consider a network as illustrated in Fig. 3 , however without link n. It is straightforward that J Ã is equal to the RGN.
We continue to focus on a special case in which there exist at least two "smallest" users in the system, i.e., there exist users
Therefore, the excess of
Moreover, from Definition 3.3 and (27), it follows that
Denote the flow profile at the RGN as f and assume by contradiction that there exists a user k for which J Therefore, e K 1 ðJ RGN Þ > e K 1 ðJ Ã Þ and/or e K 2 ðJ RGN Þ > e K 2 ðJ Ã Þ, which is a contradiction to (28) . Now assume by contradiction that there exists a user k for which J k RGN < J Ã sys . According to Lemma 3.2, any system-optimal flow profile f Ã is balanced. Thus, there does not exist a system-optimal flow profile f Ã and a user k for which J k ðf Ã Þ < J Ã sys . It follows that at the RGN there must exist another user i for which J i RGN > J Ã sys , which is a contradiction.
t u
The conditions of Theorem 3.4 describe a range of scenarios for which the nucleolus is always equal to the systemoptimal flow profile. For example, in a network where users have a finite number of different demands, e.g., "large", "medium" and "small", the conditions of Theorem 3.4 are satisfied for a network with at least two "small" users. Of course Theorem 3.4 also holds in a network where all users Through Theorem 3.1 we established that a flow profile which is optimal from a system's perspective is also stable against coalitional deviations. Moreover, Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.3 establish that the min-max fair nucleolus is (i) stable and (ii) system-optimal or disadvantageous for the smallest user in the system. Finally, Theorem 3.4 describes an interesting set of scenarios where the RGN is a desirable solution, from a fairness perspective, from a social perspective, and easy to implement due to its stability.
ADDITIVE ROUTING GAMES 4.1 Maximin Respresentation
In contrast to bottleneck routing games, we now focus on users that are interested in additive performance measures, such as delay or packet loss. Moreover, we focus on the parallel links model as described in Section 2. Thus, from [1] , f Ã is a unique vector of link flows and the system-optimal proportional flow profile (4) is unique in the individual link flows. Moreover, since a coalition S behaves as a single user controlling the flow of its participants, it follows from (2) that
Consequently, as stated in (8), the maximin strategy of the users in M , N nS is equal tô
and givenf M , the coalition S send its demand according tô
The (malicious) user M aims to send its demand according to (30) and sends an amount of flowf M l on each link l 2 L, such that, when S responds according to (31) , its cost is maximized. To describe the behavior of M at the maximin flow profile, we first establish several lemmas. In each lemma we start out with a flow profile f ¼ ðf M ;f S ðf M ÞÞ, wheref S ðf M Þ denotes the best-response routing strategy of S given f M , i.e., given f M the coalition S sends its demand according to (7) . We then change the strategy of the malicious user to g M , whereafter the coalition S responds with a new best-response strategyĝ S ðg M Þ. Finally, we draw conclusions on the cost of S at ðg M ;ĝ S ðg M ÞÞ. Denote the best-response strategy of S to f M and g M as, respectivelyf S , andĝ S . Consider the flow profile f ¼ ðf M ;f S Þ and order the links such
We define the set of the links with the lowest cost per unit of flow at f as
The first lemma establishes that when M decreases the amount of flow it sends on the links with the lowest cost, it also lowers the cost of S. 
M and an amount of flow D ,
Proof. In order to establish the lemma, we construct an alternative routing strategy for S, g S . By definition, the cost of S when applyingĝ S will be less or equal to its cost at g S , i.e.,
Thus, it is sufficient to construct a feasible routing strategy g S , which satisfies
We consider two cases: 
Consequently, there exists some link r for which g Now consider Subcase 2b. We start atf S and construct g S by sending an amount of flowf Through Lemma 4.2, we have proven that it is in the malicious user's interest to send more flow on the links with the lowest cost per unit of flow. We are now able to establish the following theorem. 
i.e., such that the set of links inL does not change. According to Lemma 4.2, this increases the cost of S. Thus,f N N nS does not maximize (8) , which is a contradiction. Hence, at its optimal routing strategy, N nS will send its flow according to (5) .
According to Theorem 4.1, for any coalition S N at its maximin strategy, the users in N nS act as if they were a set of self-optimizing non-atomic users. Moreover, S represents a single finite user and sends its flow according to its bestresponse strategy (31) . This specific scenario has been investigated in [39] , [49] among others. In [49] it has been established that, for additive routing games, the setting of selfoptimizing non-atomic users together with a single finite user S, admits a unique equilibrium. Therefore, as a result of Theorem 4.1, we conclude that the maximin profile is unique for any coalition. Further, in [39] the following lemma is established. 
In other words, Lemma 4.3 implies that the average cost of a deviating coalition decreases when its aggregated demand increases. Note that this result is similar to Lemma 3.1 for bottleneck routing games, although in Lemma 4.3 the costs are averaged.
The Core
We continue to describe the core of our coalitional game with additive costs. In the following proposition we establish that in general, not every system-optimal allocation lies in the core. This is in contrast to Theorem 3.1, which considers bottleneck routing games. Proposition 4.1. Consider an additive routing game and suppose there exists a coalition S and a maximin flow profile ðf N N nS ;f S Þ, which is not system-optimal. There exists a systemoptimal flow profile whose corresponding cost vector does not lie in the core.
Proof. Our goal is to construct a system-optimal flow profile f such that for some coalition S N with maximin flow profile ðf N N nS ;f S Þ it holds that,
Consider a coalition S N and a maximin flow profile ðf N N nS ;f S Þ 6 ¼ f Ã as described in the proposition.
Also consider the two complementary sets:
We construct a new routing strategy for S, f S in which it "fills" up the links in L À according to the system optimum, starting from link L upwards. Since
. At the new flow profile, S's cost is equal to
becausef S is the best-response strategy tof N N nS and from [1] it follows that the best-response strategy is unique. We now change the routing strategy of N nS and construct a flow profile f , ð f N N nS ; f S Þ that is system-optimal and for which
we have constructed a feasible system-optimal flow profile for which
We define the strategy f N N nS as follows. On any link users interest to deviate from the proposed system-optimal cost vector and send their flow proportionally to the maximin flow profile, i.e., for all i 2 S, J i >Ĵ i , which satisfies (38) . It follows from Definition 3.2 that the system-optimal profile f, at which users in S proportionally split their flow, does not lie in the core. t u
According to Proposition 4.1, for additive routing games, in general not every system-optimal cost allocation lies in the core. Nevertheless, we focus on a particular cost allocation that does always lie in the core. Proof. Assume by contradiction that the system-optimal Proportional Cost Allocation (4), does not lie in the core. Hence, there exists a coalition S for which it is worthwhile to deviate from the proportional flow profile and incur its cost at the maximin flow profile ðf N N nS ;f S Þ, as defined in Definition 3.1. Therefore, it follows that for all users i 2 S
However, it follows from Lemma 4.3 that 8S N :
which turns into
Since, (42) implies that if any coalition S N deviates from the PCA, there must exist some user i 2 S, for which
This is a contradiction to (41) . Therefore, the Proportional Cost Allocation lies in the core. t u Theorem 4.2 illustrates that the proportional flow profile is not only system-optimal, but also stable against coalitional deviations. Moreover, as a result of Proposition 4.1, in an additive routing game stability is a specific property of only certain system-optimal flow profiles, in particular the proportional flow profile.
Note that Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.1 consider users with standard cost functions. In Appendix B, available online, we provide an example of a network where the users' cost functions are not standard. In that example, users have different performance objectives, and the proportional flow profile does not lie in the core. This illustrates that Theorem 4.2 heavily depends on the setting of the system. Nevertheless, Theorem 4.2 states that, for users with standard additive performance objectives, if all users send their demand according to the proportional routing strategy, then (i) the system is optimal and (ii) none of the 2 N À 1 possible coalitions would benefit by deviating from this strategy. Thus, for such users the proportional flow profile is easy to implement and highly desirable from a "social" perspective.
The Routing Game Nucleolus
We now continue to describe the RGN of our additive routing game. Due to the cost function in (29) , for additive routing games we define a slightly different excess for each coalition, which is normalized in the coalition's demand. Specifically, for each coalition S & N and a cost vector JðfÞ, e S ðJðfÞÞ ,
Hence, we consider the "average dissatisfaction" of a coalition S at a cost vector JðfÞ. Similarly to bottleneck routing games, we first prove that the RGN lies in the core. 
Proposition 4.1 establishes that, in contrast to bottleneck games, not all system-optimal flow profiles are stable. Nevertheless, as a result of Theorem 4.2, we established that the Proportional Cost Allocation is optimal from a system's perspective and is stable for users with additive cost functions. Finally, Theorem 4.3 establishes that, for symmetric users, the PCA is equal to the nucleolus. Thus, it is highly recommendable from a network design perspective that users with additive performance objectives send their flow according to the proportional flow profile.
CONCLUSIONS
We investigated a coalitional routing game from a worstcase perspective. In particular, we described the cost of each of the 2 N coalitions as corresponding to their maximin flow profiles. This represents the performance that the coalition can guarantee itself, even under the pessimistic expectation that the agents outside the coalition have unpredictable or even malicious objectives.
There are several ways for users in the network to depart from the noncooperative setting and jointly implement a cooperative solution. One way to accomplish this is through a mediator, e.g., a network administrator, which proposes a solution to all users in the network. An agreement between users will be signed on condition that all users benefit from the solution's implementation. Describing the cost of a coalition as its maximin value implies that after a coalition S deviates from the agreed upon strategy, the users outside the coalition are willing to act maliciously. As explained in the Introduction, practically this can be achieved when all users sign an additional agreement through which they are forced to carry out their threat or else face heavy penalties [15] . The main goal of our study has been to investigate several solution concepts in order to see how users (and the system) benefit once these solutions are implemented.
For bottleneck routing games, we established that any agreement that is optimal from a system's perspective, lies in the core. Such stability is highly desirable and makes it possible to implement the agreement (e.g., through a mediator), since no possible coalition of agents would benefit from deviating from the proposed solution.
Additionally, we introduced the Routing Game Nucleolus and established that the smallest agent in the system will never prefer the nucleolus over the system-optimal Proportional Cost Allocation. Furthermore, we described an interesting set of scenarios at which a mediator, should propose to implement the system-optimal and min-max fair nucleolus. In particular, when the two smallest agents in the system are of equal size, the nucleolus corresponds to a system-optimal flow profile. On the other hand, in general the nucleolus is hard to compute, (see, e.g., [51] and references therein). Thus, when the conditions of Theorem 3.4 are not satisfied, due to considerations of complexity, a mediator might be better off proposing a stable agreement without min-max fairness guarantees such as the Proportional Cost Allocation.
For agents with additive costs, our study focused on load balancing (routing) among servers (links). We established that, at the maximin flow profile, the malicious users act as if they were a continuum of infinitesimal (i.e., nonatomic) self-optimizing agents. Using this result, we established that, in contrast to bottleneck routing games, stability is generally not shared by every system-optimal allocation. Nevertheless, we showed that the system-optimal Proportional Cost Allocation lies in the core, and for symmetric agents it is equal to the nucleolus. Hence, these results suggest that it would be advantageous for all agents (and the system) if they send their demand according to the system-optimal proportional flow profile. Our results establish that such an agreement is stable, optimal from a system's perspective, and for symmetric agents it adds min-max fairness guarantees. We also established that, when agents in the network have vastly different performance objectives, even the PCA does not guarantee stability. This suggests a design guideline that attempts to separate among homogeneous groups of users (e.g., "highly delay-sensitive", "less delay-sensitive but highly sensitive to packet loss", etc.) so that each group would agree to share its own network resources according to the Proportional Cost Allocation.
Finally, we note that in our study we modeled the user (and system) performance to be solely determined by its link performances in the network. This means that a user will not take any "cost of cooperation" into account when choosing which paths to route its flow on in the network. However, it is possible to add a "cost of cooperation" to a user's "performance cost". Users take their cost of cooperation into account when deciding if the cooperative scenario is at all preferable over the noncooperative scenario. The total cost of user i now becomes a combination of its performance cost J i and its cost of cooperation, which we denote by a i for user i. Denote the performance cost of user i in the cooperative scenario and noncooperative scenario as J i andĴ i respectively. Each user i has a function g i ðJ i ÀĴ i Þ which represents i's monetary gain when switching from a noncooperative scenario to a cooperative one. Only if a i < g i ðJ i ÀĴ i Þ is it worth for user i to cooperate. Thus, the mediator that proposes a cooperative solution concept must make sure that a i < g i ðJ i ÀĴ i Þ holds for all users i 2 N .
